2016. North Carolina. The Republican-controlled General Assembly is drawing the state's thirteen congressional districts. The legislators leading the effort instruct their mapmaker to use political data to produce a delegation of ten Republicans and three Democrats.
A Republican chairman of the redistricting committee explains why they stopped at ten. He did "not believe it [would be] possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats."
And this: "I think electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country."
A Democratic state senator objected that locking in a 10–3 advantage was not "fair, reasonable, [or] balanced," because as recently as 2012, "Democratic congressional candidates had received more votes on a statewide basis than Republican candidates." The map still passed on a party-line vote. That November, Republican candidates won 10 of the 13 seats (Rucho v. Common Cause, June 27, 2019, majority opinion, pp. 2–3).
2011. Maryland. The Democrat-controlled Legislature is drawing the state's eight congressional districts. Governor Martin O'Malley, a Democrat, leads the process. He later testified that his aim was to "use the redistricting process to change the overall composition of Maryland's congressional delegation to 7 Democrats and 1 Republican by flipping" one district.
They went after the Sixth, which a Republican had held for nearly two decades. Equal population required moving only about 10,000 residents. The plan moved roughly 360,000 out and 350,000 in. Registered Republicans in the district dropped by about 66,000. Registered Democrats rose by about 24,000. The map passed on a party-line vote. In 2012, the Sixth flipped (Rucho, majority opinion, pp. 5–6).
Two states. Two parties. Same move.
They picked their voters. Then they waited for November to confirm it.
The thesis
In Part 2, we saw what a reliable bloc is worth. A voter who weighs every candidate on the merits is expensive. You have to earn that vote every two years. A voter whose identity comes with a party attached is cheap. You only have to remind them who they are…and who the enemy is.
Once those voters live in predictable camps, you can do something even more valuable. You can draw a district around them.
I'll say it plainly.
The cheap voter becomes a safe seat.
Then you don't have to win the district over. You already picked it. And when November is a formality, the election that matters moves somewhere smaller: the primary. A much thinner slice of the public decides who gets in.
That's the power play in this part. They pick the voters. Then they guard the door.
How EXACTLY does that work?
Watch the steps.
Step one: people sort themselves. This isn't a trick by itself. In 2014, Pew found that 50% of consistent conservatives and 35% of consistent liberals said it was important to live in a place where most people share their political views. Liberals would rather live in cities, Pew found, while conservatives prefer rural areas and small towns. And 63% of consistent conservatives, and 49% of consistent liberals, said most of their close friends shared their politics. Among people with mixed views, and among those who are mostly liberal, just 25% said the same (Pew Research Center, June 12, 2014).
Friends. Neighborhoods. That's the sorting we measured in Part 2. It makes the next step easier.
Step two: someone draws the lines. Sometimes the lines mostly follow the neighborhoods people already chose. That's geography. Sometimes the map is drawn to pack the other party's voters into a few districts, and crack the rest into many they can't win. That's partisan gerrymandering.
Those are not the same thing. A lopsided map can come from clustering, from mapmakers, or from both. And partisan gerrymandering is not the same as racial gerrymandering, which federal courts still review. The Court in Rucho was careful about that distinction. So should we be.
But watch what the mapmakers in these two cases said they were doing. In North Carolina, they named the 10–3 outcome in advance. In Maryland, the governor named the 7–1 outcome in advance, and the Sixth District was rebuilt far beyond what equal population required. That isn't "the neighborhoods did it." That's a choice.
Step three: a safe seat moves the real election to the primary. If one party is almost sure to win in November, the fight that actually fills the office happens earlier, in front of a smaller crowd. In some states, that crowd is limited to party members.
The National Conference of State Legislatures, in a page updated May 19, 2026, describes closed primaries as contests limited to registered party members. Independent or unaffiliated voters "are excluded from participating in the party nomination contests." That system, NCSL says, "deters 'cross-over' voting by members of other parties and generally contributes to a strong party organization." In Maryland, Oklahoma, and Oregon, the formal rule is "partially closed": the parties may open the door to unaffiliated voters. At the time of NCSL's update, both parties in all three states had chosen to allow only their own members (NCSL).
Parties have a real interest in choosing their own nominees. A party is a private association, not a public utility. The cost is still worth naming. When the general election isn't competitive, the people locked out of the primary are locked out of the decision that matters.
And that decision is already being made by a sliver of the country. In the 2022 midterm primaries, turnout of all eligible voters was 21.3%. That was higher than the midterm primaries of 2018 (19.9%), 2014 (14.3%), and 2010 (18.3%). It was still only about one eligible voter in five. Nearly four out of five did not participate in choosing the nominees (Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2023; press release, March 7, 2023).
Read that fairly. That's a national figure for one midterm cycle. It is not the share that decided every seat, and it is not a count of this year's races. It is the size of the crowd at the door.
A captured district is a cheaper district. The campaign no longer has to persuade the whole constituency. It has to satisfy the nomination electorate.
None of this means every seat is safe, or that November never matters. It means that once a seat is made safe, November stops being the place where the office is won.
Alternate domination, in practice
In Part 1, we heard George Washington warn about "the alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge." He called it "itself a frightful despotism" (Washington's Farewell Address, 1796).
Your side wins, then their side wins, and each round settles a score.
This is what that looks like with a map in hand.
When Republicans controlled the process in North Carolina, they drew for a 10–3 Republican delegation. When Democrats controlled the process in Maryland, they drew for a 7–1 Democratic delegation. Each side, in its turn, used the same tool to keep what it had won.
That's not a glitch in the system. That's the system being used the way a faction uses a tool: to make the next election easier than the last one.
The voters still show up in November. They just have fewer places where their showing up can change the result.
What the Court did — and didn't — decide
On June 27, 2019, the Supreme Court took both maps up together in Rucho v. Common Cause. The district courts had struck them down. The Court vacated those judgments and sent the cases back with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Not because the maps were fair.
The majority called the plans "highly partisan, by any measure." Then it held that claims of excessive partisanship in districting present a "political question" and are "nonjusticiable—outside the courts' competence and therefore beyond the courts' jurisdiction." And it said this plainly: "Our conclusion does not condone excessive partisan gerrymandering" (Rucho, majority opinion, pp. 2, 7, 31).
Federal courts still police racial gerrymandering and the rule that districts must have equal population. They stepped back only from this kind of claim.
The majority also said complaints about districting need not "echo into a void." It pointed to other doors: state constitutions and state courts, independent commissions, state laws that limit partisan favoritism, and Congress's power under the Elections Clause (Rucho, majority opinion, pp. 30–33).
Justice Kagan, dissenting, doubted those doors would open where the maps had already done their work. "The politicians who benefit from partisan gerrymandering are unlikely to change partisan gerrymandering," she wrote. "And because those politicians maintain themselves in office through partisan gerrymandering, the chances for legislative reform are slight." She added that fewer than half the states let voters put initiatives on the ballot; in the rest, "including North Carolina and Maryland," voters have to depend on legislators to make the change (Rucho, dissent, pp. 29–30).
You can agree with the majority about the limits of federal courts, or with the dissent about the cost of those limits. Either way, hold onto this: the Court did not bless the maps. It said it was not the venue.
Here in Maine, the process is built to make a one-party map harder to pass. A bipartisan apportionment commission proposes the districts, and the Legislature has to enact that plan or one of its own by a two-thirds vote in each house. If it doesn't, the state Supreme Judicial Court draws them instead (Maine Constitution, Art. IV, Part Third, §1-A; 21-A M.R.S. §1206). That isn't a claim that Maine has solved the problem. It's a reminder that the rules for who holds the pen are a choice.
Opening the primary doesn't do what the brochures promise
If the door is the problem, opening it should help. That's the usual reform pitch: let more people into the primary, and you'll get less extreme legislators.
A 2014 study in the American Journal of Political Science tested that idea across state legislatures. Eric McGhee and his colleagues matched a large set of state legislator voting records to a detailed accounting of primary systems. Their finding: "the openness of a primary election has little, if any, effect on the extremism of the politicians it produces" (McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers & McCarty, 2014). In the conclusion, they put it more sharply still. The results "generally fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect," and where effects showed up, they were often "the opposite of those that are typically expected: the more open the primary system, the more liberal the Democrat and the more conservative the Republican" (author PDF).
That's an honest limit, and it matters. This study is about state legislators, not members of Congress, and it doesn't prove primaries are harmless. It does mean you shouldn't count on a rule change at the door to undo the sorting that already happened in the neighborhood…or the map drawn around it.
The safer seat is not just a function of who is allowed to vote in the primary. It's a function of who was placed in the district to begin with.
Why this matters now
Here's what this part shows. And what it doesn't.
It doesn't show that every district is a gerrymander. It doesn't show that parties shouldn't choose their own nominees. It doesn't show that opening the primaries would fix polarization. And it doesn't tell you how many seats this year were decided before November. These are older maps, and a national turnout number, not a scorecard of the present Congress.
What it does show is the conversion. Part 2's cheap voter is useful in a competitive race. Part 3's cheap seat is better. Once the camps are sorted, a map can turn a bloc into territory. Then the primary, not the general, becomes the election that counts, and a much smaller public stands at the door.
Both parties have used that conversion when they held the pen. North Carolina's Republicans named a 10–3 map. Maryland's Democrats named a 7–1 map. Washington saw the pattern before either party had a modern machine for drawing it: take your turn, then make the next turn harder for the other side.
That's how power piles up. And how it stays put.
Ask yourself
Would I accept this map if the other party drew it?
If the answer is no, the map was never about fairness. It was about keeping the seat.
And if the election that actually fills the office is a primary most eligible voters skip, whose vote is the one that counts?
Talk to your neighbors. Especially the ones the map was drawn to outvote.
Next: Part 4, "They Manufacture the Emergency…Paid for With Your Card." Seats are one harvest. The same sorted, scared groups also pay the bills.
Sources
- Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ___ (June 27, 2019): https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
- Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public, Section 3, June 12, 2014: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/section-3-political-polarization-and-personal-life/
- Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public, June 12, 2014: https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
- National Conference of State Legislatures, State Primary Election Types, updated May 19, 2026: https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/state-primary-election-types
- Bipartisan Policy Center, 2022 Primary Turnout: Trends and Lessons for Boosting Participation, March 2023: https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Primary-Turnout-Report_R03.pdf
- Bipartisan Policy Center, "Nearly 80% of Eligible Voters Don't Participate in Primaries," March 7, 2023: https://bipartisanpolicy.org/press-release/voters-dont-participate-primaries/
- George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796 (U.S. Senate): https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Washingtons_Farewell_Address.pdf
- Constitution of the State of Maine, Art. IV, Part Third, §1-A (Apportionment Commission): https://legislature.maine.gov/ros/LawsOfMaine/App/views/constitution.html
- 21-A M.R.S. §1206 (congressional reapportionment): https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/21-a/title21-Asec1206.html
- McGhee, Masket, Shor, Rogers & McCarty, "A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology," American Journal of Political Science, 2014 (first published online Oct. 31, 2013): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12070
- McGhee et al., author PDF: https://research.bshor.com/publication/a_primary_cause_of_p/a_primary_cause_of_p.pdf



